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Neoclassical Difficulties:
Tort Deterrence for Latent Injuries*
W. L. F. FELSTINER and PETER SIEGELMAN
Economists often claim that the tort system leadsfirms to provide consumers
and workers with the socially optimal level of safety. Moreover, in the case of
work-related hazards, employers are alleged to have anothersource of incentives to take precautions. If wages are sensitive to job-relatedrisks, employers
should spend money to reduce such risks when, by doing so, they can save
more in wage costs than the costs of the precautions taken.
Whatever their merits in other settings, in the case of latent injuriessuch as
workplace exposure to asbestos neither tort nor market are likely to provide an
optimal level of safety; indeed, they have failed to do so in the examples we
discuss. We find that the introduction of a long delay between the exposure to
a hazard and the onset of symptoms introduces a variety of empirical complications that overwhelm the assumptions on which the neoclassicalmodel
rests. Our conclusion is thus that comparisons between tort and alternative
systems of deterrence/compensation should start from an empirical assessment of how the tort system actually works (and doesn't work), rather than
beginning with misleading theoreticalclaims about the system's optimality.

1. INTRODUCTION

The deterrent effect of tort compensation is a pressing social issue and has
spawned an immense literature. The particular difficulties posed by latent
injuries have generally been ignored in the academic and political struggle
although such injuries have affected large numbers of people (Boden and
Jones, 1987: 321) and are likely to plague even larger numbers in the future
(McCulloch, 1986: 231-33).' The thesis of this paper is that latent injuries
introduce empirical complications that overwhelm the assumptions on
which the deterrent effect of tort compensation found in neoclassical
economic theory is based. 2 This point is essentially negative. We are not
suggesting that regulation, social insurance, or other schemes are superior
to tort as a means of securing an optimal allocation of resources for
accident prevention. Rather we argue that the theoreticalmodel of tort as
the baseline for comparison of alternative systems is misleading because, at
least in the context of latent injuries, it cannot work as predicted by the neoclassical model.
* We acknowledge the thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of Ian Ayres, Mary Coyne,
John Braithwaite, Robert Dingwall, John Donohue, Tom Durkin, Wendy Espeland and Mark
Grady.
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Although the main argument of this paper is that in calculations about
safety precautions firms cannot take the long term into consideration, we
begin by reciting the case that today's firms and their managers frequently
do not even want to do so. 3 This argument has three strands: that American
firms are increasingly short run optimizers; that they have conflicting goals
and structures that interfere with coordinated efforts at maximization; and
that managers confronted by uncertainty often seek personal goals at the
expense of organizational ones.
Hirsch (1987) and Drucker (1986) have argued that it has become increasingly irrational for American corporations to make decisions based on longterm considerations. The main effect of investment banker and arbitrageur
involvement in corporate ownership is that a corporation's value now
depends on its ability to maximize the short-term return on shareholder
investment. 4 Hirsch's (1987: 18) case studies demonstrate that the favored
path to this goal is the elimination of long term planning, development, and
capacity through downsizing, dismantling, and increasing debt. Executives
of nearly all large American corporations have responded to this market
pressure (Hirsch, 1987: 45-47). As divisions have been summarily eliminated, and company officials fired, often without regard to productivity and
experience, managers have responded with a new ethos-that of Free
Agent, concerned far more with their own future than the company's
(Hirsch, 1987: xvi, 109-10) and ready to leave the company whenever a
better offer is at hand. 5 Peters and Waterman (1982: 43-52) have argued
that a short-term focus also follows from an over-reliance on superficial
analyses and a bias against innovation. American firms rely on cost-benefit
analyses that undervalue or ignore long term efforts and benefits (research
and development, productive capacity, high morale, company goodwill)
that are difficult to quantify in favor of readily available figures (material
costs, inventory turnover, sales) that are more easily obtained. The capacity
to measure only short run projects precisely leads to analyses that focus on
monthly, quarterly, or single year goals. Thus future values are not just
discounted to present value, but further discounted because the benefits are
so difficult to quantify. 6 The link between future profits and present actions
is further weakened by the so-called agency problem-the fact that
managers of most firms make decisions rather than the owners, and the
interests of the two parties do not always coincide. There is a vast literature
on the ways in which firms are structured to reduce this divergence of
interests and no consensus about the degree to which efforts to enforce
maximization are successful. It is clear, however, that the problem is likely
to become more acute as the planning horizon gets longer.
Organization theorists long ago abandoned the idea that firms acted
toward a single, coherent goal (see, e.g., Allison, 1970; Scherer, 1980:
29-41). Not only do organizations seek multiple and often conflicting goals,
but employees use their power to convert resources to secure sub-organizational objectives. Allison's "government politics model" (1970, ch.5)
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recognizes that results are determined by the interplay of influential actors
holding influential positions. Players enter the game with different agendas,
levels of formal authority, skill, power, and control of crucial information.
As in the Cuban missile crisis, the politically modified "score of the game"
group or person intended, and far from the
is often distinct from what any
7
organization's best interest.
Many neoclassical economists would object to the way these propositions
overpersonalize corporate decision-making. Their analysis assumes that
firms are forced by competition to try to maximize the present discounted
value of future profits. Managers may disagree on goals and seek short-run
objectives, but market forces curtail such behavior so that deviations from
profit maximization are limited. Market discipline is said to arise from two
sources: competition in the market for the products that firms sell and
the market for capital in which virtually all firms participate. The basis
of product market discipline is simple: "In the austere environment of
complete and perfectly competitive markets, there is no alternative desideratum left against which the value of the firm might be traded off." (Nelson
and Winter, 1982: 54). Thus, firms that do not minimize costs, for example,
cannot generate the market rate of return on their capital at the market
price for output, and will sooner or later go bankrupt. Using some ingenious
simulation techniques, however, Nelson and Winter (1982) have demonstrated that firms that follow non-maximizing heuristic decision rules can
nevertheless survive in the long run, even in industries where many firms are
strict profit maximizers. Thus even ignoring changing business conditions
and organizational and psychological theory, the neoclassical view that
product market competition guarantees that firms will be maximizers is not
necessarily correct.
The second source of discipline is the market for capital. In this view, "it
is to the external discipline provided by the takeover raider, rather than the
internal discipline imposed by [the owner] that society looks for the
effective functioning of the [firm]" (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 54). If a firm
fails to maximize profits, its stock price will be depressed; it will then be
a tempting target for takeover by new owners, who will be able to make a
profit by buying at the low price, restoring profit maximizing behavior, and
raising the price of the stock they own. Even in theory, however, recent
work (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980) demonstrates that it is not at all clear8
how much discipline takeovers, or capital markets in general, can provide.
Furthermore, notions of bounded rationality and statistical ignorance
also suggest that firms fail to maximize profits over time horizons as long as
those involved in many latent injuries. The uncertainty and complexity of
the profit-maximization problem increase exponentially as the planning
horizon expands. Simon (1957) and others have argued that such complexity
leads to "satisficing" behavior even in the short run because the problem of
achieving maximum profit is simply too difficult to solve. Rules of thumb
or extrapolation from past practice, rather than an optimizing calculus,
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govern business decisions, especially those whose consequences will be felt
in the distant future. The body of this paper is a demonstration that the
level of complexity in the latent injury context virtually guarantees the
impossibility of long-run maximization.
Finally, further doubts about the profit maximizing assumption in the
context of latent injuries stem from the nature of the uncertainty involved.
Virtually all economic models treat uncertainty in a convenient, but highly
stylized fashion. The paradigmatic example is flipping a coin, a case in
which the exact outcome (heads or tails) is not known in advance, but the
range of possible outcomes and the probabilities of each are given (or can be
learned over time). This kind of uncertainty poses little difficulty for model
makers. If the agent being modeled is risk neutral, the expected value of the
9
uncertain outcome can be substituted for its uncertain range of outcomes.
Rather than choosing a single action which produces the best average
payoff under a range of known circumstances, decision makers for longterm projects such as spending to avoid latent injuries know neither the
range of possible outcomes nor the probabilities associated with each.
However such choices are actually made, it seems clear that they can not be
made as they are modeled in mainstream economics, since the range of
possible outcomes and the level of ignorance are far greater than any
planner could contemplate.' 0 Moreover, most business decisions are
. . . unique, in the sense that [they] are most unlikely to replicated anywhere

else in the economic system, and . . . can never [be] repeated. Actuarial or
statistical probability has no application to an experiment which is nondivisible and non-seriable [not repeatable]; it makes no sense to apply the
arithmetical processes which belong to actuarial probability to a purely
subjective estimate of probability. Carter (1972: 30).

1I. CAUSAL ASSUMPTIONS AND EMPIRICAL REALITY
There is no single authoritative neoclassical analysis of the working of the
tort system:" Here we abstract what we take to be the key assumptions or
requirements of this style of modeling that are particularly sensitive in the
context of latent injuries.
Most work in mainstream economics assumes that firms maximize the
present discounted value of (expected) profits from the present through the
infinite future. Suppose a firm is considering whether or not to spend
money today on product safety which will prevent some injury that becomes
manifest thirty years hence. The benefits of making this expenditure are the
damages the firm will avoid having to pay to injured parties and the litigation expenses it will escape. If these benefits are properly measured and
weighed in the firm's calculations, then the neoclassical analysis leads to the
conclusion that the firm will decide to spend the socially optimal amount on
safety. If there are distortions in the way the firm factors these distant
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benefits into its decisions, however, then the amount spent on safety will
depart from the optimum.
Now let us examine the operation of these neoclassical assumptions.
First, future damages would be discounted to present value. A $100,000
adverse judgment thirty years in the future would at a 100% discount rate
approximate a $6000 current penalty. A firm ought not then spend more
than $6000 to avoid the harm that thirty years from now will underlie the
$100,000 judgment (Viscusi, 1986: 322).12
Second neoclassical theory does not consider workers exposed to toxic
substances to be random casualties of capitalist production, but rather
people who have to some degree bargained for the harm by accepting extra
compensation for the extra risks that they assumed at the workplace
(Rosen, 1986: 642). There is considerable empirical support for the proposition that people are compensated to some degree for job risks (see Smith,
1979; references cited in Landes and Posner, 1987: 309). But there are
several factors that suggest that we should not abandon our concern for the
worker on this account. What is the evidence about the relationship between
risk and wages in the latent injury context? Since the theory of equalizing
differences assumes a substantial amount of information on both sides of
the labour market (Rosen, 1986: 663), is there reason to believe that we
stray farther from this condition when the risk involved is latent rather than
apparent? Second, are there alternative theoretical formulations that ought
to make us suspicious of the exchange of risk for higher wages? We will
discuss these and other caveats later in this paper.
What reservations ought one consider about this economic analysis of
discounted compensation, wage rates and safety measures? First, there is
the unstable nature of the $100,000 adverse judgment. Maybe it will prove
to be $200,000 or $2,000,000 or $50,000. In those cases the reasonable
company official ought to spend $12,000 or $120,000 or $3,000 to protect
the worker against the risk. The problem is not that the theory of deterrence
is illogical or that discounting is an inappropriate way to transform future
into current values, but that there is no reliable way to determine the future
values. Who knows what the legal rules governing the allocation of respons13
ibility or the calculation of damages will be thirty years from now?
Asbestos company officials in the US in the 1930s, 40s and 50s were undeterred from putting consumers and workers in jeopardy not because they
ignored the legal consequences of their own behavior, but because they did
practice that would
not predict the changes in legal doctrine and pre-trial
14
facilitate the litigation that eventually erupted.
Are these changes in doctrine and practice of a sort that their effects may
be reasonably estimated? Even if they occur over many years, their consequences may be incorporated in rational decision-making if their direction
and pace are reasonably predictable. But the changes in tort law are neither
even nor unidirectional. 15 The orthodox understanding of the drift of
American tort law since World War II is a steady erosion of the fault
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concept until the 1970s followed by swift and unanticipated changes in socalled superstrict liability, comparative negligence and its connection to
joint and several liability, Sindell rules, the explosion in large punitive
damages awards, changes in the structure of chapter 11 reorganizations
under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, retroactive waivers of statutes of
limitation, the formal organization of plaintiffs' lawyers by type of mass
tort and the resources that they have been able to generate and deploy, and
the willingness of courts to transform insurance contracts into compensation devices. In the other direction, that is, toward limiting tort recoveries,
the US Justice Department has given unusual attention to tort reform, 16 and
at the state level we have seen the growth of a well-financed American Tort
Reform Association determined to reverse the doctrinal innovations of the
past two decades. There are also the research program of the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice, founded in 1980, on which much of the
tort reform rhetoric is based, and the large number of legislatures that have
adopted measures to limit the number and level of tort recoveries such
as caps on non-economic damages, limitations on contingent fees, mandatory pre-trial arbitration, limitations on punitive damages, facilitating or
requiring periodic payment of judgments, prohibiting prejudgment interest,
limiting dram shop and municipal liability and modifications to the collateral source rule and of joint and several liability. 7 Just as yesterday's
managers grievously underestimated the threat of tort compensation, and
underinvested in safety measures, how do we know that their contemporary
counterparts are not overreacting to what will prove to be short-term trends
in tort recoveries and, as a result, now overinvest in safety. In other words,
setting the level above or below which it is inefficient and therefore socially
"undesirable" to invest in harm reduction by discounting future projections
based on current recoveries is a reasonable process only for analysts who are
willing to turn their backs on the enduring volatility of American tort law
18
(see Sugarman, 1985: 566, 585).
Moreover, there are unpredictable changes beyond those in rules that will
influence tort compensation of the future. If Friedman's reading of history
in Total Justice (1985) is at all accurate, then base rate changes in matters
such as public attitudes toward risk and compensation can be expected to
alter the behavior of juries and the value of tort cases when the relevant time
periods are as long as the 20-40 years involved in many occupationallygenerated diseases. Whatever the juries of tomorrow may do, it is often not
even clear what they are doing today. Firms may and probably do organize
and analyze their own recent experience, but the experience of researchers
who have studied asbestos litigation suggests that industry, or even multifirm, data do not exist (see McGovern, 1988: 54): in fact such information is
considered more a trade secret than a metafirm asset, despite its obvious
utility in predicting long-term exposure of single firms. Insurance and
capital markets in theory compensate for a firm's inability or disinclination
to respond to the signals provided by future tort compensation. For instance,
if firms guard information about risk as a trade secret, rational insurers
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ought to insist on such information before providing insurance. Moreover,
insurance ought to mitigate the myopia of managers intent on today's
profits by focusing their attention on the extent to which today's premiums
reflect exposure over time, even long periods of time. Bondholders in theory
behave in like manner, requiring higher interest from firms vulnerable to
large, future liability claims. The problem with this analysis is that the
insurance companies and capital markets are no better able to predict the
rules, science and culture of the future, to assimilate the imperfections of
the legal system into their calculations or to correct the flaws in wage
9
differentials than are the producers.'
Second, economic theory assumes that firms take into consideration the
costs of defending future claims as well as compensation that they will be
required to pay. Such costs are also unpredictable. Variation in costs arises
from factors such as the number of defendants involved in typical cases (the
more defendants, the more complicated are both discovery and negotiations), the level of disputing between defendants, between defendants and
their insurers and between insurers, and the extent to which defendants and
their insurers can coordinate their defense efforts. The Asbestos Claims
Facility claimed to have reduced defense costs substantially, but how could
asbestos manufacturers in the 1940s predict either the need for or growth of
a private dispute processing system like the ACF, or its collapse, or indeed
the innovative trial and settlement techniques adopted by US federal courts
in East Texas (see Hensler et al., 1985: 60-63) and Ohio (see McGovern,
1986; see also McGovern, 1988 for the methods adopted by the bankruptcy
court in Virginia to process the 300,000 claims filed against A. H. Robins).
Since the defense costs in asbestos cases in the US through 1982 were
virtually as large as the gross amounts paid to plaintiffs and their lawyers
(Kakalik et al., 1984: 76), their economic significance is as formidable as it
was unpredictable.
Third, there is the problem embedded in the reality that not all injured
workers or users will recognize that their injuries are work-related or
exposure-related and that, among those who make the connection, not all
will seek to recover damages (see Felstiner et al., 1981; Felstiner and
Dingwall, 1988). One reason that some injured workers do not sue is the
difficulty they may have in exploiting information about firm behavior
developed in prior litigation (or on occasion in identifying experienced
counsel) because defendants have been able in settlement of earlier suits to
insist that the plaintiff's lawyers bring no more cases or assist others who
do (see Lord, 1987: 45 (Dalkon Shield); Brodeur, 1985: 242 (asbestos);
Yates, 1987: 17 (Bic lighters); Cherniack, 1986: 71-72 (Hawk's Nest Tunnel).
The economically efficient penalty would be that amount which reflected
the injuries of those who do not claim as well as those who do (Cooter &
Ulen, 1988: 460-61). Multiplying damages as in antitrust might, or liberal
jury sympathy in fact may, internalize these consequences within firms to
an extent. However, given the system's lack of stability no information can
be generated on which to base the correct multiple.
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The Dalkon shield litigation is instructive about the extent to which
claiming behavior is a settled social phenomenon. Before the worldwide
publicity required by the bankruptcy judge some 16,000 claims had been
brought against A. H. Robins, the manufacturer of the device. After the
public notice, nearly 300,000 claims were filed with the court (McGovern,
1988: 26)20 and even Robins has acknowledged the validity of 33,000 of
them (NY Times, 11/7/87). Such huge fluctuations in injury identification
and propensity to claim underline the difficulty of making decisions about
expenditures to prevent harm that are geared to the present value of an
unknown number of injuries that produce an unknown number of claims of
an unknown size at an unknown time in the future. The signals that managers
need to determine how much to spend on harm reduction are epidemiological, while the signals that are provided by the tort system, flawed as they are,
are about claims rather than victims and there is no known reliable method
21
of back-estimating the universe from which the claiming sample came.
Fourth, tort deterrence must come to terms with imperfections in the
legal system. 22 For instance, in the asbestos field many injured workers are
faced with absolute barriers such as the statute of limitations in their efforts
to secure tort compensation. Limitation rules in states such as New York
and Wisconsin with large numbers of asbestos victims from World War II
and Korean War shipbuilding programs required injured workers to institute
suit before they could be expected even to know that they were sick (Mark,
1983: 882).23 The discounted present value of zero is zero, but no economic
theory would tolerate a method for estimating the appropriate level of riskreduction expenditures that ignores the injuries suffered by large numbers
24
of uncompensated workers.
Fifth, there is the evidence of what firms actually do in response to signals
that the tort system in fact provides. We know that in the asbestos industry
the response frequently was to suppress scientific and medical information
rather than improve working conditions or provide warnings about product
dangers (see Murray, 1988: 289; Brodeur, 1974: 142, 207; Brodeur, 1985:
111-24, 145, 276; Castleman, 1986: 61, 88-91, 608). Even more suggestive
is Eads and Reuters's (1983: vii, ix) conclusion after studying nine large
manufacturing firms "generally recognized as leaders in the safety field"
that "although product liability exerts a powerful influence on product
design decisions, it sends an extremely vague signal. Because the linkage
between good design and a firm's liability exposure remains tenuous, the
signal says only: 'Be careful, or you will be sued.' Unfortunately, it does not
say.., how careful to be."
Sixth, the sociolegal risk is exacerbated by unpredictable changes in
victim vulnerability. For instance, the chances that asbestos exposure will
lead to serious illness are strongly related to smoking. Thus the probabilities
over the past forty years that people would suffer asbestos-related injuries
depended on changes in population smoking patterns undeterminable
by asbestos company officials. Furthermore, changes in medical science
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cannot be ignored. Although it is probably true that the most threatening
latent injuries involve various forms of cancer and cures for many forms of
cancer, including lung cancer, have been particularly intractable for
medicine, nevertheless the economic consequences of current exposure to
toxic substances are affected by unpredictable medical advances and the
costs of as yet undeveloped medical therapies.
Seventh, fixing the level of risk reduction is in theory affected by the
trade-off between wages and safety measures as well as that between discounted compensation costs and safety measures. If the more dangerous a
job, the more that workers will demand in wages, there is a point at which it
is in the interest of the firm to reduce the danger rather than pay the added
labor costs. This homeostasis at which the costs of accident prevention and
labor are minimized will be reached, or even approximated, only if the
workers have sufficient information about the risks of their jobs to insist
that such risks be incorporated in the wage rate.
Thus the question: how reasonable is it to impute economic calculations
about risk to workers? The threshold issues concern who has the necessary
information about risk in fact and who has the superior opportunity to
acquire it in theory. In the asbestos context, the manufacturers had the
information and aggressively concealed it from exposed workers. "A
worker may be denied information essential to an informed decision as to
whether to continue working in a contaminated environment, as happened
to asbestos workers in the late 1950s" (Locke, 1985: 275; see Berman, 1978:
1-4). "Available evidence suggests that few firms make a comprehensive
effort to inform workers of the risks they face. For example, no firms tell
their employees the average annual death risk they face" (Viscusi, 1983: 71).
In fact, corporations traditionally consider laboratory studies of hazards in
their own products to be secret information (see Dow v. Ryan, 108 S.Ct 344
988 L.Ed.2d 370 (cert. denied 1987), as reported in NY Times, 11/17/87,
p. 13; NY Times, 1/30/88, p. 9 (Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company's 30
years of secret studies on the dangers of cigarette smoking)). 25 Not only
may company officials conceal from workers information that they have
developed, but they may organize corporate behavior so as not to produce
relevant information, e.g., by restricting research (see Brodeur, 1985:
111-124).
Information is itself a complicated variable in any risk-related calculations. The best signal concerning job-related risks is one's own injury
experience (Viscusi, 1983: 65). Victims of latent injuries rarely have such
experience until it is too late to quit a hazardous job. How many workers
know that the history of medicine suggests that the negative health effects
of toxic substances are likely to be more numerous and more serious than
the first identified risks. 26 Moreover, risks often are stated in ways that
are inaccessible to laypeople or mistakenly over-simplified; 27 and recent
research indicates that most people systematically misunderstand important
probability relationships (e.g., they treat low probability events as having
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either a zero or excessively high probability) (see Tversky and Kahnemann,
1974). In view of these considerations it is not at all surprising that asbestos
workers secured only small wage premiums on account of the added risks of
their jobs (Barth, 1982; Boden and Jones, 1987: 337).
The task of separating economists from their*theory is formidable, even
in the presence of data that strongly suggest that the theory is inapplicable.
Nowhere is this observation more trenchant than in the asbestos case. The
theory of compensating wage differentials has been a tenet of welfare
economics since Adam Smith (Landes and Posner, 1987: 309). Paul McAvoy,
onetime member of President Ford's Council of Economic Advisers and
Frederick William Beinecke Professor of Economics at Yale, now Dean of
the Graduate School of Management at the University of Rochester, really
endorses the theory. Writing in the New York Times (2/82 Sunday Business
Section), McAvoy criticized workers for failing to demand higher wages on
account of the risks they faced in the asbestos insulation industry. The crisis
in the insurance industry produced by asbestos claims was theoretically
unimaginable by McAvoy and occurred only because the workers let the
theory down. A more empirically inclined social scientist might have concluded that the theory let the workers down.
Setting aside information problems, evidence about the adequacy of compensating differentials for latent injuries is unpersuasive. Empirical tests of
the theory of compensating wage differences are inconclusive except for the
risk of death (Smith, 1979: 349). Moreover, wage differentials based on risk
of death provide poor signals about risk reduction since large variation in
risk is associated with small variation in wage differentials (Smith, 1979:
346). Most importantly, Smith (1979: 349) notes that "all the studies on
compensating differentials for the risk of death use data on traumatic
injuries or known excess death rates-data where the assumption of worker
knowledge is plausible." Where such an assumption is implausible, as in the
case of latent injuries, employers are not pushed in the direction of safety
measures by the threat of increased labor costs if they fail to make riskreducing adjustments in production methods.
The wage differential theory may have another practical flaw for occupations in which risk and work are inseparable and the work is relatively
skilled. The connection between compensating wage differentials and social
optimality depends on the availability of safe, but otherwise equivalent,
jobs (Boden and Jones, 1987: 333) and such employment is not always
available. Boden and Jones (1987: 337) illustrate this point by the case of
asbestos insulation workers who were paid a "very small" differential
(compared to bricklayers) although 44% of the deaths among insulator
members of the relevant union were due to asbestos-related diseases. They
'28
attribute this small effect to the "lack of comparable job opportunities.
Moreover, the model of people as interest maximizers is limited in the
area of employment decisions. Because work is an important expression of
their identity, people often work when to do so is economically irrational.
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For an Appalachian coal miner to leave mining for work in a shop to reduce
his employment risk would frequently be an unthinkable mode of calculation; his sense of self-worth is as a coal miner, in this case an identity that
allows no place for worrying, or being seen to worry, about the risks of the
work. Ackerlof and Dicken's (1982) economic model of cognitive dissonance explains how workers may systematically and "rationally" tend
to ignore occupational risk. The model starts with the observation that
"workers in dangerous jobs are often quite oblivious to the dangers that are
involved" (1982: 308). Cognitive dissonance operates because "persons not
only have preferences over states of the world [as is typically assumed in
economic theory], but also over their beliefs about the state of the world"
(1982: 308). Dissonance reduction requires that the worker in an unsafe job
"choose his beliefs according to whether . . . the psychological benefit of
suppressing his fear exceeds the cost due to increased chances of accident.
[If so] the worker will believe the activity to be safe" (1982: 308). The model
demonstrates that in the presence of cognitive dissonance, fully-informed,
utility-maximizing workers will nevertheless make suboptimal choices about
the amount of workplace risk to which they are exposed.
The theory of compensating differentials predicts that in a situation of
perfect information, all positive and negative dimensions of jobs would be
factored isomorphically into the wage rate. The risk increment would be
equal to whatever additional wage qualified workers would demand,
assuming no other qualified workers could be found to work for less. Does
29
this theory ignore the existence of tort and other compensation systems?
Where the potential of risk is transformed into the actuality of accident or
illness, the consequences to the worker are additional expenses, lost wages,
pain and suffering, emotional distress, loss of consortium and incidental
damages. Some of these items are the ingredients of workers' compensation
recoveries and almost all of them are covered by tort damages before
attorney's fees are deducted. 30 If the theory ignores compensation systems it
would predict worker demands that are greater than actual demands,
although workers surely know something about their health insurance and
rights under workers' compensation and tort. If the theory does not ignore
compensation, what does it assume that workers do know about these
compensation systems? A worker with as good information and data skills
as an economist who is also a tort lawyer ought, we suppose, to take into
account the value of any preference for no injury over an injury coupled to
compensation, the probabilities that he will secure various forms of compensation, the extent to which compensation is incomplete or duplicated
and the transaction costs of securing it. Whatever such a theory might
assume that workers know about compensation for traumatic injuries, it
must assume that workers have at least the same difficulties in estimating
compensation for latent injuries that we have in earlier parts of this paper
shown to face managers. The obvious conclusion is that a worker cannot be
expected to include in wage demands information that is unavailable even to
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economists, lawyers and managers; which is to say that the information on
will be
which the theory of wage differentials depends almost certainly
31
unavailable to those to whom the theory presumably applies.

111. CONCLUSION

We are skeptical of reliance on the deterrent effect of discounted future
compensation and risk-induced wage differentials to determine socially
optimal levels of safety when a substantial portion of the information that is
in theory to be relied on is opaque or distorted in practice. Information
difficulties are related to difficulties in predicting the rules of the future, the
so-called sociolegal risk; imperfections in claiming behavior and in the legal
system; limitations in information that the tort system provides about
future recoveries and transaction costs; and limitations in worker information and in worker assessments of risks and consequences.
These difficulties do not mean that tort compensation has no deterrent
effect. If firms were relieved of responsibility for latent injuries caused by
their products and working conditions, the care taken with respect to users
and workers would almost surely be diminished. But the deterrence claims
of laissez-faire economics are much more ambitious than a simple unmeasurable connection between legal responsibility and care. Economic
theory asserts that tort compensation and, where workers are concerned,
wage rates, tell firms exactly how much care to exercise. Our analysis
suggests that tort compensation does not and, if32the tort system remains in
its current form, cannot provide such guidance.
To reject tort compensation and compensating wage differentials as the
basis for safety-related decisions does not demonstrate the superiority of
alternatives. Given the acknowledged difficulties in government supervision
of worker and consumer health and safety issues (see, e.g., McCaffrey,
1982; Nobel, 1986; Nelkin and Brown, 1984; Claybrook, 1982; Hill, 1987;
Eads and Reuter, 1983: x, xi), especially the instability of such programs
33
from one federal administration to another (see Shapo, 1984: c. 10 at 87)
and the current tendency toward deunionization of American industry
(Kochan, 1985; Ginger and Christiano, 1987; Grenier, 1988), the prospect
in the U.S. of relying on government and/or union intervention is hardly
encouraging. 34 Nevertheless, skepticism about the deterrent value of tort is
politically important. Serious efforts are underway to replace tort with
various forms of workers' compensation and social insurance (see Stewart,
1987; O'Connell, 1985, 1987a, 1987b). It would be a mistake in that corner
of the debate that is concerned with latent injuries to prefer tort over
alternative compensation systems because of its theoretical advantage in
deterrence if that advantage were an illusion-if in this instance the hand of
the market has in fact disappeared.
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NOTES
1. By latent injuries we mean those for which the lag between exposure to the
injurious agent and manifestation of harm is measured in years at least, and
frequently in decades. Three classes of victims are afflicted with latent injuries
caused by business firms-users of business-produced products, workers who
make those products, and bystanders. Illustratively, in the first class have been
victims of thalidomide, acutane, bendectin, the Dalkon shield, Agent Orange
and asbestos; in the second class are workers in asbestos factories and employees
of chemical and nuclear plants; bystanders have been victims of nuclear leaks
and tests, dioxin leaks and non work-related asbestos exposure. Because of the
bar to employee tort claims theoretically imposed by workers' compensation,
our analysis is primarily directed to the first and third classes. The situation of
workers is introduced because (a) workers injured by asbestos do have a tort
remedy against asbestos manufacturers; (b) the exclusivity of workers'
compensation is under attack (Barth, 1984; 570); and (c) partial experience
rating of workers' compensation makes the economic theory applicable to tort
compensation potentially relevant.
2. Deviations from perfect maximizing behavior need not be large to have significant effects. In a highly provocative article, Ackerlof and Yellen (1985) ask
"Can Small Deviations From Rationality Make Significant Differences to
Economic Equilibria?" and conclude that they can. The intuition behind
this theoretical result is difficult to explain, but its consequences are profound.
No longer is it reasonable to claim, as many Chicago school economists do
(see, e.g., Landes and Posner, 1987: 12-13), that "nearly-maximizing" action
produces virtually the same results as maximizing behavior.
3. Even in the case of harms with immediate effect some analysts (e.g. Braithwaite,
1984: Fisse, 1983) believe that sanctions (such as fines and tort damages) imposed
on corporations are ineffective in controlling the behavior of corporate officials
who are themselves unaffected by the penalties.
4. Stein (1988) presents a neoclassical model formalizing these conclusions.
5. Hechinger (1988: 25) has identified the same short-term focus in business schools
and their students. A recent report of the American Assembly of Collegiate
Schools of Business reported that training "focused too much on the short term
at the expense of taking a broader, deeper, long-range perspective." Corporate
executives reported that new MBA's were "afraid of actions that cannot be
backed up with a detailed quantitative analysis" (Porter & McKibben, 1988: 99).
6. Economic models of criminal justice have also been criticized for ignoring information quality and availability problems and hidden transaction costs (see
Coffee, 1980: 440-49.)
7. The psychological literature on the dilemma of the commons (Hardin, 1968) also
makes one skeptical that actual behavior follows neoclassical economic logic. In
a series of experiments Brewer and her colleagues have shown that in the absence
of any of a set of unusual conditions people will destroy a common resource on
which they all depend in the long term in order to maximize short-term
gratification. These studies imply that managers would sacrifice current profits
by instituting safety measures against latent injuries only when assured that
managers of rival firms or rival divisions of the same firm were adopting the
same course (Messick et at., 1983) or when forced to do so by external controls
(Messick and Brewer, 1983) or when limited social distance between decision
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makers and victims reduces distinctions in managerial welfare calculation
(Brewer, 1979). In other words, in a context of intense competition for shortterm results, weak regulation, and hierarchical labour relations, which is the
general situation of American industry, this research predicts that managers do
not incorporate the very long-term into their profits and safety calculations.
In addition, maximization theories must confront "the optimality problem."
Although neoclassical models frequently seek to demonstrate that markets
produce optimal results, no model can be a model of everything-thus, any
demonstration of optimality is at best only a showing that given certain
externally generated assumptions, an optimal result is achieved. Consider, for
instance, a change in legal procedure that might have an effect on the costs of
bringing or defending a suit, on the awards to successful plaintiffs, and so on. If
firms act in accordance with traditional economic models, this hypothetical
change will lead them to alter their behavior-for instance, to increase their
spending on safety or reduce their labor force. Assuming that there are no
distortions, the new levels of safety and labor will be optimal given the new rule.
However, the original level of safety was also optimal given the old rule. The key
point, then, is that "mere" optimality given the existing rules may not be very
interesting, even were it consistently attained. To evaluate the social utility of the
tort system, one thus needs to look not only at how firms respond, or fail to
respond, to any given set of rules, but whether the rules themselves are optimal.
Landes and Posner (1987) have recently argued that most rules of tort law are
indeed optimal. But, just for example, whether the statute of limitations in
asbestos cases should be five years, or fifteen years, or whether indeed there
should be any statute of limitations at all, is far from obvious. Green (1988) and
Epstein (1986), for instance, look at this question and derive dramatically different answers. If the statute of limitations is set "incorrectly" and firms make
maximizing calculations on the basis of the "wrong" rule, the system may
appear to be producing optimal results, but will in fact be failing to do so.
Moreover, firms attempting to make decisions about how much to spend to
prevent latent injuries must optimize not only on current rules, but on expected
future rules as well.
If the agent is risk-averse, then the problem becomes slightly more complex, but
still easily manageable.
See Arrow and Hurwicz (1972) and Carter (1972) for some alternative views on
decision making under ignorance.
For recent surveys of the economics of tort, see Landes and Posner (1987) and
Shavell (1987).
The theory assumes that the tortfeasor itself pays the damages. If tort liability
can be covered by insurance, then the firm ought not spend on safety more than
the amount that the liability will increase the insurance premiums discounted
from the date of the increase. Where insurance premiums do not vary directly
with liability, the theory would predict no deterrent effect to tort compensation.
Thus, we ignore insurance in the rest of this paper. This decision is only
questionable if insurance company information problems in the tort area are
substantially different from those of manufacturing firms and insurance
companies are better able than producers to predict the long-term development
of tort doctrine, changes in defense costs, legal culture, propensities to sue and
worker demands induced by risk. In the asbestos field, insurance companies discussed surchanges on products liability policies (Brodeur, 1985), but there is no
evidence that they even shared claims data to form estimates of incidence or
compensation.
Is this uncertainty like that faced by people who have "no idea" about the height
of the Empire State Building? New Yorkers know that the ESB is more than
twenty feet and less than a mile high. If asked enough questions they could
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construct a probability distribution for their best guesses about its height. If the
same kind of probability distribution had been calculated by asbestos manufacturers, it would not have been very useful since the actuality proved to be far
out in the tail of any manager's likely expectations.
Danzon (1987: 228) notes that actuarially-fair liability insurance is particularly
difficult in the case of latent injuries: "The longer the delay between the triggering
event . . . and the manifestation of injury and adjudication of claims, the
greater the potential for changes in liability rules and damage standards. This
sociolegal risk introduces uncertainty as to the mean (the past cannot be used to
predict the future) and destroys independence, since trends will similarly affect
all policyholders."
Nor is the tort law subject to change centralized. To estimate future recoveries,
firms would need to predict the relevant jurisdictions in which their behavior
would be evaluated as well as the rules of those jurisdictions.
After years of rebuffs in Congress, proponents of tort reform on the federal
level have adopted a new strategy consisting of modest aims (validating the state
of the art defense, promulgating a 25 year statute of repose and limiting punitive
damages), trying to assure that the business community speaks with one voice
and mobilizing more members of Congress not known for a pro-business
orientation.
Carroll, 1987: 47-72 lists 189 statutes adopted in 1986 in forty-one states that
restrict tort recoveries. These efforts to reduce the number of tort claims and
limit recoveries have had limited success in the past (see Adams and Zukerman,
1984; Sloah, 1985; Danzon, 1985; GAO, 1986). More recent research on medical
malpractice does report a negative effect on claims frequency and award size (see
Danzon, 1986). Since the pace of reform accelerated substantially in 1987 and
the effort shows no signs of slackening, its eventual effect may be substantial.
See also Nelson, 1988: 686-89 which provides a powerful critique of the data
and logic behind the work of the Attorney General's Tort Policy Working
Group.
Schuck (1986: 185-86) and others have pointed out how in toxic tort cases the
combination of the rules requiring a plaintiff to establish causation by a preponderance of the evidence and providing that plaintiffs who meet that standard
recover 100% of their damages means that often those damages will be greater
or less than the risk created by defendants and that defendants will, as a consequence, be over or underdeterred. Of course, given our view of the deterrence
problem, this complication simply makes an impossible calculus worse.
"Many of the nation's insurers had known for decades that asbestos workers
were dying early, but had kept silent while their underwriters wrote policies for
workmen's compensation and comprehensive general liability as fast as they
could put pen to paper, and as the premiums from those policies were invested
with the full expectation that few, if any, claims for asbestos disease would ever
be made." (Brodeur, 1985: 200). Where firms predict that no or minimal
damages will have to be paid to victims of occupational disease, it would be
prudent for profit maximizers to mobilize a large supply of healthy workers to
replace sick employees who can no longer work rather than spend resources on
care. This analogy to the use of military manpower has been documented in the
construction of the Hawk's Nest Tunnel (Cherniack, 1986). Of course, where
there is not perfect substitutability of labor, there is an incentive to care for those
with skills in short supply. In the military context, if the pool of soldiers is
sufficient, the functional equivalent of tort damages as an influence over care is
public opinion (see Lorell and Kelly, 1985: 56, 74, 82).
After checking for duplication, claims made in error and without injury, 200,000
claims remained, 193,000 of which had not even "entered the tort system during
the 15 years of Dalkon shield litigation" (McGovern, 1988: 26). McGovern
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(personal communication), the Special Master in the chapter 11 proceeding,
believes that 50,000 of these cases are "lawsuit caliber," suggesting that the tort
system in the ordinary course had mobilized about 30% of the potential claimant
market.
21. The limiting case analysis may differ from product to product. When Ford produced defective Pintos, it knew how many were sold and what percentage were
likely to be defective. It did not know how many lawsuits might result, but it had
a worst case scenario to serve as a benchmark. Manufacturers of intermediate
products like asbestos and many dangerous chemicals have no way to predict the
number of ultimate users and thus no credible worst-case scenario from which to
start risk reduction calculations.
22. See Hensler et al. (1985: 37-44) for a review of the procedural obstacles to tort
claims for asbestos-related injuries. Problems embedded in legal rules are, of
course, deficiencies in the legal system, not in economic theory. But they cannot
be ignored by economists on that account unless, unlike most lawyers, economists believe in the perfectability of legal rules.
23. The New York statute was changed in 1986 to the discovery rule. New York also
created a one-year window for workers barred in the past by the then existing
exposure rule. See Chapter 682, Laws of New York, 1986. Between 3000 and
4000 claimants took advantage of the window.
24. See Johnson and Heler (1984) for an analysis of the adequacy and equity of
compensation to survivors of 560 asbestos workers who died from workplace
exposure between 1967-77. This paper is more a critique of workers' compensa*tion than of tort damages which became an important source of compensation
for asbestos workers only in the 1980s.
25. "Companies . . . camouflage their [products'] faults from the [government]
inspectors by such means as using scientists who regularly test their products and
can be relied upon not to submit distressing results" (Flood, 1988: 813). Firms
are even reluctant to grant employees access to their own medical records
(Braithwaite & Fisse, 1983: 75) and have been known to conceal clinical indications of occupational disease from them (Berman, 1978).
26. Asbestos and tobacco products are obvious examples. The first connections of
these substances were to pulmonary diseases, but they were followed by links to
stomach cancer (asbestos) and heart disease (tobacco).
27. See, for instance, The New York Times misstatement of the risks of breast
cancer at the time of Nancy Reagan's mastectomy (see Altman, 1987). How
many people untrained in probability theory could understand the Love
correction (see Love, 1987a,b)?
28. The predicament has become more acute in an era of migratory employers who
have little hesitation in exporting dangerous jobs to labor markets where the
economic value of life is lower than in the US. Viewed in this light, Bhopal-like
disasters are predictable for if expenditures on safety ought to be a function of
compensation paid to injured consumers, bystanders and workers, then more
ought to be spent on safety in the US than on a comparable plant in India.
29. Rosen's (1986) review essay in the Handbook of Labor Economics never mentions the effect of tort or workers' compensation or first-party insurance on the
theory of equalizing differences.
30. We ignore further complications like the existence in the US of contingent fees
and the collateral source rule, the effects of which are quite surely unknown by
workers. There is, moreover, a way of looking at the accident problem in which
workers may secure double recovery from the combination of higher wages and
tort damages since the wage ingredient of damages would be inflated for the
disability period although the worker would not be at risk in that period.
31. Unlike the situation of firms and managers, there are absolutely no competitive
forces that serve to check worker deviations from utility maximization.
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32. We are not first or foremost in this conclusion. "The [deterrent] value of tort
liability ... is thought on the whole to be negligible" (Ison, 1967: 89; see also
references in Sugarman, 1985: n. 12). On the other hand, Landes and Posner
(1987, ch. 7) have suggested modifications of the present system which they feel
will overcome most of its weaknesses. They argue for awarding probabilistic
damages to all those who might potentially be affected by a catastrophic or
latent tort, regardless of whether they have experienced an actual injury at the
time the suit is filed. Thus, suppose a nuclear reactor melts down, exposing
100,000 people to radiation. Twenty-five percent of those exposed will develop
cancer thirty years hence, and the monetary damages of those affected will be
$200,000. The Landes and Posner proposal calls for the court to award damages
of $50,000 to each of the 100,000 potential victims, rather than awarding the full
$200,000 to the 25,000 who eventually developed cancer.
While this suggestion may offer an improvement over current practice, it is
not a complete solution. First, the most troublesome kinds of latent injuries arise
from gradual exposure to an ongoing hazard (asbestos) as opposed to a sudden
and discrete event (nuclear meltdown). Second, the scientific and epidemiological data needed to assess future harms are often likely to be unavailable at
the time that exposure occurs-in fact, the exposure might not even be widely
recognized as problematic until its effects begin to be felt, many years in the
future. Finally, Landes and Posner underestimate the importance of legal infrastructure to the prosecution of compensation claims for latent torts. Such claims
are not only brought on a contingent fee basis, but generally require significant
out-of-pocket investment by individual lawsuits. Any rule change that reduces
the recovery per case reduces the incentive for lawyers to hazard such
investments unless they are assured of a corresponding increase in the number of
clients they represent, a consequence there is no reason to predict. For a
description of the problems of organizing class actions in mass tort cases, see
Hensler et al., 1984: 52-60. Oi (1984) has raised similar objections to an earlier
version of the Landes/Posner proposal.
33. A comparable lack of faith in the stability of regulation of health and safety may
not be appropriate for the UK. Regulatory arrangements are in Britain derived
from tradition more than from formal rule and regulatory agencies are run by
civil servants relatively impervious to ministerial direction. Thus the power of a
new national government to alter the course and intensity of regulation is limited
because it cannot change the regulators and there are by and large no constitutive rules for it to amend. For econometric evidence that British regulation in
the form of notices (but not factory visits and prosecutions) makes a difference
in the level of ingested lead in exposed workers, see Fenn, 1988: 7.
34. John Braithwaite suggests that the same collective action dilemma that exists
with individual corporate actors may apply to individual regulators. To an
important extent both corporate and regulatory executives are evaluated by one
or a number of "bottom line" measures. If the bottom line disaster does not
materialize for thirty years and if the assessment system is (for good reason)
unconcerned with second-guessing the executive's assessment of the facts, but
only with assessing outcomes, then long latency is an unsolvable performance
assessment problem. The assumption that the regulatory executive will strive to
be good at achieving the agency's goals is generally not misplaced: performance
assessment tends to secure this identity of interest between the individual
executive and the interests of his organization. But the longer the latency period,
the more likely the executive will have moved on to another agency (or have
retired) before the performance assessment system catches up to him and the less
plausible the assumption of an identity of interest between the individual and the
organization.
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